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Abstract—In the envisioned 5G, uplink grant-free multiple ac-
cess will become the enabler of ultra-reliable low-latency commu-
nications (URLLC) services. By removing the forward scheduling
request (SR) and backward scheduling grant (SG), pilot-based
channel estimation and data transmission are launched in one-
shot communications with the aim of maintaining the reliability
of 99.999% or more and latency of 1ms or less under 5G new
radio (NR) numerologies. The problem is that channel estimation
can easily suffer from pilot aware attack which significantly
reduces the system reliability. To solve this, we proposed to
apply the hierarchical 2-D feature coding (H2DF) coding on time-
frequency-code domain to safeguard channel state information
(CSI), which informs a fundamental rethinking of reliability,
latency and accessibility. Considering uplink large-scale single-
input multiple-output (SIMO) reception of short packets, we
characterize the analytical closed-form expression of reliability
and define the accessibility of system. We find two fundamental
tradeoffs: reliability-latency and reliability-accessibility. With the
the help of the two fundamental trade-offs, we demonstrate how
CSI protection could be integrated into uplink grant-free multiple
access to strengthen URLLC services comprehensively.
Index Terms—URLLC, grant-free uplink access, pilot-aware
attack, reliability, accessibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the services and applications that require stringent
latency and reliability emerging quickly, future fifth generation
(5G) wireless networks have defined a new category, i.e., low-
latency and ultra-reliable communication (URLLC), to accom-
modate those services and applications comprehensively [1].
To order to support URLLC services, air interface technologies
are experiencing an evolution of long term evolution (LTE)
and also a revolution towards 5G new radio (NR). Among
these, grant-free uplink access is recognized as a key enabler
in which ultra-low latency is achieved by novel orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) slot structures and
flexible/scalable numerologies while high reliability is main-
tained by advanced channel coding and robust channel state
estimation with margin for estimation error [2].
A preliminary fact is that conventional uplink transmission
procedures consist of random access channel (RACH) opera-
tion, pilot-based channel estimation, scheduling request (SR)
transmission, scheduling grant (SG) transmission and finally
data transmission [3]. By removing the procedures of SR and
SG transmission, grant free uplink access reduces the latency
significantly and also compels channel estimation and data
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Fig. 1. Time-frequency domain illustration of pilot-aware attack on pilot-
based channel estimation during uplink grant-free access.
transmission to become more dependent on each other for
such one-shot transmission. Take a blind detection scheme
in grant-free Sparse code multiple access (SCMA) in [4] for
example in which a closed-loop SCMA system was constituted
by active user detection, channel estimation and data decoding.
Pilot-based channel estimation provides necessary feedbacks
for performance revisions and improvements of iterative active
user detection and data decoding. Basically, the reliability of
grant free uplink access severely relies on both the resilience
of pilot-based channel estimation and the reliability of data
packet decoding.
Pilot-based channel estimation requires that determinis-
tic and publicly-known pilot tones be shared on the time-
frequency resource grid (TFRG) by all parties such that the
receiver can recover the channels experienced by pilot signals
shared with the transmitter [3]. The first step to keep the
resilience of channel estimation is to maintain the authenticity
of pilots because applying the same pilot tones at the receiver
with the transmitter guarantees the authenticity for channels
estimated by default. As shown in Fig. 1, the critical problem
is that a pilot-aware attacker which senses and acquires the
public pilot information can practically jamm/null/spoof those
pilots to destroy their authenticity, thus paralyzing the whole
regular channel estimation [5]. Due to the imprecise channel
estimation, the data packet decoding which requires accurate
channel state information (CSI) as a prerequisite become
2beyond being reliable.
Previously, it has been mentioned in [6] that attacking
channel estimation is with high priority and more power-
efficient than the behavior of jamming data packet decoding.
Besides, the recent accidents caused by pilot aware attack
indicate that the conventional pilot-based channel estimation
is suffering significant risks [7]. The commonsense built to
resolve this issue is pilot randomization which transforms
the pilot-aware attack into a hybrid attack, including si-
lence cheating (SC), wide-band pilot jamming (WB-PJ),
and partial-band pilot jamming (PB-PJ) attack. As a
successful practice, authors in [7] proposed a hierarchical 2-
D feature coding (H2DF)-coding based pilot authentication
scheme which can protect pilot-based channel estimation by
first delivering pilots between transceiver pairs in the form
of diversified subcarrier activation patterns (SAPs) and then
securing its retrieval process. A valuable result is that the
time-domain consumption of H2DF coding are K +1 OFDM
symbols providedK users simultaneously access the network.
This give us a hint of applying H2DF coding to safe-
guard the channel estimation of grant-free multiple access.
Given the constraint of latency of 1ms or less, this operation
however makes the OFDM symbols for data transmission
change dynamically with the number of access users. How to
characterize the system reliability and is it possible to apply
H2DF coding in grant-free multiple access? In what follows,
we aim to answer the above question and show that our answer
is yes. The specific contributions are summarized as follows:
1) We propose a novel active user detection algorithm
whereby perfect identification of attack modes and per-
fect detection of active users can be realized both.
2) We characterize a novel expression of failure probability
of uplink grant-free multiple access in the regime of
large-scale antenna arrays with a matched filter receiver.
Based on this, we find a novel reliability-latency trade-
off under protected CSI.
3) We define the ξ-accessibility of uplink grant-free multi-
ple access with protected CSI as the ratio of the number
of active legitimate users that could maintain the failure
probability less than ξ to the total number of OFDM
symbols consumed during this period. We show that
there exist a reliability-accessibility trade-off.
II. BASIC ACCESS CONFIGURATION AND ATTACK MODEL
A. Packet and Frame Structure
In URLLC, the latency that requires optimization consists
of the processing latency Tp and the time to-transmit latency
Tt. Tp is constituted by three parts, i.e., the time of the channel
acquisition, control channel decoding, and data detection. Tt
is determined by the time-domain frame structure which de-
pends on the non-square packet arrangement in the frequency
domain. In order to minimize Tp and Tt, a mini-slot structure
proposed in [13] is considered, where each slot is divided into
multiple mini-slots and each is equal to the transmission time
interval (TTI) of Ts. The corresponding frequency-domain
subcarrier spacing is configured as∆f . Ts and∆f both follow
the 5G NR numerologies.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of pilot-aware attack on uplink grant-free multiple access.
Here, we consider the total latency T constituted by the
following:
T = (me +md)Ts + Textra (1)
where me denotes the number of TTIs for channel estimation
and md denotes the number of TTIs for data transmission.
Textra denotes the time for other operations in BS and UE
during the transmission.
B. Uplink Grant-Free Multiple Access
The basic uplink transmission procedures consist of ran-
dom access channel (RACH) operation, pilot-based channel
estimation, SR transmission, SG transmission and finally data
transmission. By removing the procedures of SR and SG
transmission, grant free multiple access can reduce the latency
significantly.
With this configuration, the RACH operation is responsible
for establishing the connected state of radio resource con-
trol (RRC) between each transceiver pair. After that, each
user prepares channel measurement and data transmission for
the one-shot contention-based access. Since SG contains the
scheduling decision for users, ignoring SG would compel BS
to perform user activity detection before channel measurement
to identify current user with access attempt. This functionality
is realized by pilot signals for which exact pilot authentication
and unique pilot allocation to each user guarantee the accuracy
of user activity detection. For the data transmission, the access
strategy includes but not limited to orthogonal frequency
division multiple access (OFDMA). Different data streams
from different users share the same time-frequency resources.
To summary, the overall procedures include pilot-based
active user detection, pilot-based channel estimation and
OFDMA-based data transmission.
C. Pilot Randomization and Pilot-Aware Attack
Pilot randomization can avoid the pilot aware attack without
imposing any prior information on the pilot design. The
common method is to randomly select phase candidates.
Each of the phase candidates is mapped by default into a
unique quantized sample, chosen from the set A satisfying
{φ : φ = 2mpi/C, 0 ≤ m ≤ C − 1, C = |A|}.
Under the circumstance of pilot randomization, pilot-aware
attacker can launch three arbitrary types of attacks, including
WB-PJ attack, PB-PJ attack and SC. The influence of pilot
3aware attack could be found in latency and reliability of grant-
free multiple-access systems. Previous research ignored the
influence of security risks on latency control and reliability
preservation. In fact, pilot-aware attack could easily paralyze
the authenticity of pilots and estimated channels. Without
proper protection, the extra abnormal latency induced by the
attack would be extremely high and the reliability of data
packet decoding based on the estimated channels would be
also very low.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us consider a uplink single-input multiple-output
(SIMO)-OFDM based grant-free multiple access system with a
NT-antenna Alice andG single-antenna legitimate users (LUs)
indexed by the set G, |G| = G. As shown in Fig. 2, LUs
consist of G−K non-active LUs (NLUs) and K active LUs
(ALUs) which are indexed by the set K with |K| = K . Each
of channels from ALUs to Alice experience the frequency-
selective Rayleigh fading. The pilot-tone based channel esti-
mation occupies me OFDM mini slots and subcarriers within
the set Ψ satisfying |Ψ|=N whereas the data transmission
consumes md OFDM mini slots and subcarriers within the
set ΨD satisfying |ΨD|=ND. A single-antenna pilot-aware
attacker (named as Ava) could disturb pilot subcarriers for
channel estimation by launching a hybrid attack.
Consider H2DF coding based channel estimation to defend
against pilot-aware attack in Fig. 3. Subcarriers within set Ψ
are dealt with separately. One single subcarrier for secure pilot
coding and one single pilot subcarrier for channel estimation
are respectively designated within each coherence bandwidth
but at different frequency-domain positions (i. e., two pilot
tones every three subcarriers). Therefore, we denote the set
of pilot subcarriers for secure pilot coding as ΨR satisfying
ΨR ⊆ Ψ, |ΨR|=NR and the set of pilot subcarriers for
channel estimation as ΨE satisfying ΨE ⊆ Ψ, |ΨE|=NE.
A. Pilot Signal Model for Channel Estimation
We denote xiL,m [k] and x
i
A [k] respectively as the pilot
tones for the m-th ALU and Ava at the i-th subcarrier and
k-th symbol time. Pilot tones are arranged following a H2DF
coding pattern on ΨR whereas those on ΨE follow the Block-
type pilot insertion mode. On both ΨR and ΨE, the way of
inserting pilot tones across subcarriers and OFDM symbols
obeys the following principle, i.e., xiL,m [k] = xL,m [k] =√
ρL,me
jφk,m ,m ∈ K, φk,m ∈ A for either i ∈ ΨR or
i ∈ ΨE. xL,m [k] can be superimposed onto a dedicated pilot
sequence having been optimized under a non-security oriented
scenario. The new pilot sequence can be utilized for channel
estimation. At this point, φk,m can be an additional phase
difference for security consideration. We do not impose the
phase constraint on the strategies of pilot insertion at Ava,
that is, xiA [k] =
√
ρAe
jϕk,i , i ∈ Ψ.
Consider the basic OFDM procedure. We focus on the pilot
tones on subcarriers of ΨE. Pilot tones of ALUs and Ava over
NE subcarriers are respectively stacked as NE by 1 vectors
xL,m [k] =
[
x
j
L,m [k]
]T
j∈Ψ
E
and xA [k] =
[
x
j
A [k]
]T
j∈Ψ
E
.
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Fig. 3. Illustration of 5G NR frame structure with transport blocks respectively
dedicated for URLLC, mMTC and eMBB.
The length of cyclic prefix is assumed to be larger than the
maximum number L of channel taps. The parallel streams,
i.e., xL,m [k], m ∈ K and xA [k], are modulated with inverse
fast Fourier transform (IFFT). Then the time-domain NE by 1
vector yi [k], derived by Alice after removing the cyclic prefix
at the i-th receiving antenna, can be written as:
yi [k] =
K∑
m=1
HiC,mF
HxL,m [k]+H
i
C,AF
HxA [k]+v
i [k] (2)
Here, HiC,m is the NE × NE circulant matrices
of the m-th ALU, with the first column given by[
hi
T
L,m 01×(NE−L)
]T
. HiC,A is a NE × NE
circulant matrix with the first column given by[
hi
T
A 01×(NAE−Ls)
]T
. hiL,m ∈ CL×1 and hiA ∈ CL×1
respectively denote the CIR vectors from the m-th ALU and
Ava to the i-th receive antenna of Alice. hiA is assumed
to be independent with hiL,m, ∀m ∈ K. F ∈ CNE×NE
denotes the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) matrix.
vi [k] ∼ CN (0, IN
E
σ2
)
denotes the noise vector on time
domain at the i-th antenna of Alice within the k-th symbol
time. σ2 is the average noise power of Alice.
Taking FFT, Alice finally derives the frequency-domainNE
by 1 signal vector at the i-th receive antenna as
y˜i [k] =
K∑
m=1
FLh
i
L,mxL,m [k]+Diag {xA [k]}FLhiA+wi [k]
(3)
where wi [k] = Fvi [k] and FL =
√
NEF (:, 1 : L).
B. Secure Pilot Coding Model
Let us briefly introduce the concept of H2DF coding. The
H2DF-(K + 1, B, C) code of length B, size C and order
K + 1 shown in [7], is denoted by a B × C binary matrix
B=[bj ]1≤j≤C where the B × 1 vector bj=[bi,j ]1≤i≤B rep-
resents its codeword. Considering its definition [7], we know
4that: 1) every sum of up to K +1 different codewords can be
decomposed by no codeword other than those used to form
the sum; 2) every sum of up to K + 1 different codewords is
distinct from every other sum of K + 1 or fewer codewords.
We spilt the columns of code matrix B into K independent
clusters. The i-th cluster includes [C/K] columns indexed by
the set Bi and constitutes a sub-matrix denoted by [bj∈Bi ].
Each i-th sub-matrix is exclusively allocated to the i-th ALU
for mapping its randomized pilot phases to its SAPs in use.
Basically, H2DF coding based pilot protection is a frame-
work of random pilot phase encoding and decoding. We define
a pilot encoder as a map from C discrete random phases into
the code matrix B. On this basis, the i-th ALU independently
conveys their own pilot phase in the form of encoded SAPs
which are programmed by codewords bi, i ∈ K. The specific
principle is that if the j-th digit of the codeword is equal to 1,
the pilot tone signal is inserted on the j-th subcarrier, otherwise
this subcarrier will be idle. Those SAPs, after undergoing
wireless channels, suffer from the superposition interference
from each other, and finally are superimposed and observed in
the form of bI at Alice. bI could be separated and identified
by Alice as bj , ∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ K + 1 which are recovered as
original pilots securely.
IV. USER ACTIVITY DETECTION UNDER HYBRID ATTACK
User activity detection is the first step before channel
estimation to determine the set K of ALUs that simultaneously
perform uplink grant-free multiple access. This refers to the
detection of the total number of ALUs and their identities.
Conventionally, user activity detection is a blind detection
process for which precise detection of active user rely on mul-
tiple deterministic and distinguishable pilots. With those pilots
being randomized, user activity detection however comes to be
a main issue before channel estimation.
Under H2DF coding framework, the user activity detection
is rather a different thing even though the channel estimation
can be protected well. let’s examine how to identify the total
number of ALUs and their identities under H2DF coding
framework. A fact is that H2DF coding creates a unique
temporal identifer for each LU such that Alice can identify
current codewords in use and their changes. This can be done
by improving the order of H2DF coding to be G + 1 and
defining the B ×
(
C
k
)
matrixBk, k = 2, 3, ..., G+1, which
is the collection of all of the Boolean sums (See Definition 1
in [5]) of codewords from B, taken exactly k at a time. The
i column of Bk is denoted by bk,i and represents a unique
sum codeword. As we can see, every sum of up to G + 1
different codewords can be decomposed by no codeword other
than those used to form the sum and every sum of up to
G + 1 different codewords is distinct from every other sum
of G+1 or fewer codewords. This means that each codeword
and each of its superposition versions with other codewords
are both unique. Therefore, the identities of codewords can
be guaranteed. When there is no attack, the total number
of ALUs can also be detected precisely base on matrices
Bk, k = 2, 3, ..., G+ 1.
Algorithm 1 User Activity Detection Under Hybrid Attack
1: According to the signal detection technique, Alice cal-
culates the number Nj of pilot signals coexisting at the
j, j ∈ ΨR-th subcarrier.
2: Alice encodes the number Nj, j ∈ ΨR as the binary
codeword bI.
Iteration:
3: if all of the elements of bI are 1. then
4: Indicate WB-PJ attack. Encode the number Nj− 1, j ∈
ΨR as the new binary codeword bI again.
5: while 1 ≤ j ≤ G+ 1 do
6: Compare bI with each column of matrix Bj .
7: if bI belongs to the k0-th column of Bj0 then
8: Break Down;
9: end if
10: end while
11: Indicate there exist j0 ALUs and decompose bk0,j0 into
the codewords of ALUs.
12: else
13: while 1 ≤ j ≤ G+ 1 do
14: Compare bI with each column of matrix Bj .
15: if bI belongs to the k1-th column of Bj1 then
16: Break;
17: end if
18: end while
19: Output bk1,j1 . Indicate there exist j1 ALUs.
20: if
NR∑
i=1
j1∑
j=1
bi,j =
NR∑
j=1
Nj then
21: Indicate SC and j1 ALUs. Decompose bk1,j1 into the
codewords of ALUs.
22: else
23: Find the set D in which for arbitrary k ∈ D each
element dk makes Nk = 1.
24: while k ∈ D do
25: Make Nk = 0 and encode the new numberNj , j ∈
ΨR as the new binary codeword bI.
26: while 1 ≤ j ≤ G+ 1 do
27: Compare bI with each column of matrix Bj .
28: if bI belongs to the k2-th column of Bj2 then
29: Break;
30: end if
31: end while
32: end while
33: Indicate PB-PJ attack and j2 ALUs. Decompose
bk2,j2 into the codewords of ALUs.
34: end if
35: end if
Output:
36: The current attack mode; The number of ALUs; The
codewords of ALUs.
The signal detection technique is applied on each subcarrier
to transform the signals into digits required for codewords.
Consider arbitrary one (e.g., the j-th) pilot subcarrier. Firstly,
Alice stack the receiving signals across NT antennas within
X+2, 1 ≤ X ≤ G OFDM symbols within the channel coher-
5ence time (Tc OFDM symbols) and derive (X + 2)×NT re-
ceiving signal matrix by YD. Secondly, Alice derives ordered
eigenvalues of R̂ = 1
σ2
YDYD
H by λX+2 > . . . > λ1 > 0
and constructs the test statistics by T = λX+2
λ1
H0
≷
H0
γ where γ
is the decision threshold. The hypothesis H0 means X + 2
signals coexist and H0 means the opposite. Authors in [7]
provides a function γ (Pf )
∆
= f (NT, G, Pf ) for determining
on one subcarrier the number of antennas required to achieve
a probability Pf of false alarm. Alice could always expect
a lower bound γ (ε∗) ≤ γ (Pf ), γ (ε∗) = f (NT, G, ε∗)
such that ε∗ ≥ Pf is satisfied. Finally, Alice could select
γ (0) as the detection threshold and derive new test statistics
Ti =
λi
λ1
Hi
≷
Hi
γ (0) , 2 ≤ i ≤ X + 1. The hypothesis Hi means
|X + 3− i| signals coexist and Hi+1 means the opposite.
With that, the numberNj of coexisting signals on arbitrary one
pilot subcarrier can be determined. For example, two signals
are recognized only when both HX+1 and HX hold true.
Based on H2DF coding and signal detection technique, the
next question is how to perform user activity detection using
Bk, k = 2, 3, ..., G+1 under the coexistence of WB-PJ attack,
PB-PJ attack and SC. The perfect detection of user activity
detection is given in Algorithm 1 for which energy detection
and coding diversity should be jointly exploited.
V. NOVEL CHARACTERISTIC OF RELIABILITY UNDER
LIMITED BLOCK LENGTHS
Perfect active user detection have been a basis for channel
estimation and data transmission which however both operate
with a certain probability of failure. The disturbance in reli-
ability of channel estimation and data transmission becomes
more severe under the stringent requirements for latency, for
example, Ts = 1ms. Therefore, it is necessary to reevaluate
the reliability and latency under H2DF coding framework.
A. Reliability of Channel Estimation
The reliability of channel estimation depends on the reliabil-
ity of pilot decoding securely. With H2DF coding, B and C
will thus satisfy B = NR = q [1 + (K + 1) (k − 1)] , C =
qk, q ≥ (K + 1) (k − 1) ≥ 3,K ≥ 1. k is a predefined
parameter which is usually configured as 2 and 3. During
pilot decoding process, the pilot identification error probability
(IEP) represents its reliability. Under maximum distance sepa-
rable (MDS) code based construction method, the reliability of
channel estimation, denoted by Pc, can be derived as follows:
Pc =
√
[1 +K (k − 1)]k
2(NR)
k
K
(4)
where NR ≥ K (k − 1) [1 +K (k − 1)], K (k − 1) ≥ 3.
B. Decoding Error Probability of Short Packet Transmission
Data decoding errors depend on the transmission rate R in
the occupied radio resources. Without loss of generality, we
assume:
1) The attack on data transmission is not considered here
because pilot-aware attack is more preferred.
2) The overloading factor of the system is not constrained,
which means that both OFDMA and SCMA can be
supported. We also assume the same number of ALUs
on each subcarrier for any access strategy.
3) All the ALUs operate at the same rate R, calculated as
R = B
ND∆f×mdTs .
4) The matched filter is employed on each subcarrier.
There are well-known expressions in the literature for cal-
culating the outage probability for transmissions over fading
channels as a function of the average signal-to-noise-ratio
(SNR), the transmission rate R and the receiver type [8]. Con-
sider single-input-multiple-output (SIMO) Rayleigh fading on
each subcarrier, the following relationship between the normal
approximation of the achievable rate R and the decoding error
probability holds:
Pd = E
[
Q
(
C (γ)−R√
V (γ)/(Ndn)
)]
(5)
where R = B
Nd∆f×nTs , Q (x) =
∫∞
x
1√
2pi
e−
t2
2 dt and C (γ) =
log2 (1 + γ) , V (γ) = 1 − 1(1+γ)2 with γ defined as the
instantaneous SNR on each subcarrier in which there coexist
Kc interfering users. Without loss of generality, we assume all
the interferers are received with the same average γ0 and the
interference is Gaussian distributed. The distribution fKc (γ)
of γ under matched filter can be calculated by:
fKc (γ) =
γNT−1e−
γ
γ0
(NT − 1)!γKc+10
NT∑
i=0
(
NT
i
)
γKc+i0 Γ (Kc + i)
Γ (Kc) (γ + 1)
Kc+i
(6)
where Γ (·) denotes the Gamma function. With this, the final
decoding error probability can be calculated by:
Pd =
∫ ∞
0
Q
(
C (γ)−R√
V (γ)/(Ndn)
)
fKc (γ)dγ (7)
C. Reliability for Grant-Free Multiple Access
To evaluate the reliability of the whole access process, the
reliability of channel estimation and decoding error probability
in data transmission should be both taken into consideration
on the basis of transmission strategies.
In this paper, at most one retransmission can be sup-
ported. The first transmission is deemed successful if the
intended ALU is correctly identified and its data is decoded
successfully. In this case, the overall failure probability is
1 − (1− Pc) (1− Pd). When the intended ALU cannot be
identified, or it is identified but its data can not be decoded, the
ALU will perform a retransmission over shared resources. The
probability of correctly decoding the retransmitted data can
be calculated by [1− (1− Pc) (1− Pd)] (1− Pc) (1− Pd).
Finally the failure probability, denoted by Pe, is given by:
Pe = [1− (1− Pc) (1− Pd)]2 (8)
61
NT
ĝHj,m0yj [k] =
dL,m0 [k]
NT
NT∑
i=1
|ĝj,m0,i|2 +
dL,m [k]
NT
K∑
m=1,m 6=m0
NT∑
i=1
ĝ∗j,m0,iĝj,m,i +
1
NT
NT∑
i=1
ĝ∗j,m0,iwj,i [k] , 1 ≤ m0 ≤ K (11)
Pe =
1− (1−√ 1
2qkK
)
Q
γasy
[
log2γasy − BNd∆f×(T−mTs−Textra)
]√
Nd × (T −mTs − Textra)√
Ts
[
γ2asy − 1
]
2 (15)
D. Asymptotic Results
It is well understood that multi-antenna technique is instru-
mental to guarantee URLLC. With massive antennas equipped
at BS, the remarkable properties tailored for URLLC could be
created, such as very high SNR links, quasi-deterministic links
and extreme spatial multiplexing capability.
Consider the case presented here. It is necessary to evaluate
the failure probability of grant-free multiple access of short
packets to massive-antenna Alice with protected CSI and under
the constraint of ultra-low latency. As the first step, we will
give the basic receiving signal model at each subcarrier, for
example, the j-th one, as follows:
yj [k] =
K∑
m=1
gj,mdL,m [k] +wj [k] (9)
where dL,m [k],m ∈ K denotes the symbol transmitted by
the m-th ALU at the k-th OFDM mini-slot and satisfies
E
[
|dL,m [k]|2
]
= γ. wj [k] = [wj,i [k]]1≤i≤NT , j ∈ ΨD
denotes the noise vector at the j-th subcarrier and the k-
th OFDM mini-slot, and satisfies wj [k] ∼ CN (0, INT).
gj,m = [gj,m,i]1≤i≤NT ∈ CNT×1, j ∈ ΨD,m ∈ K denotes
the j-th subcarrier channel experienced by the m-th ALU and
satisfies:
gj,m =
[
FL,jh
1
L,m . . . FL,jh
NT
L,m
]T
(10)
where FL,j denotes the j-th row of FL.
Two assumptions are considered. One is that precise chan-
nel estimation can be guaranteed and the other one is that
estimation errors exist. By defining ĝj,m = [ĝj,m,i]1≤i≤NT ,
receiving signals after matched filtering are expressed in Eq.
(11). Without loss of generality, take the m0-th ALU for
example. We have ĝj,m0 = gj,m0 for the first case and
ĝj,m0 = (1− λ)gj,m0 − λg˜j,m0 , 0 < λ < 1 for the second
one where ĝj,m0 ∼ CN (0, INT) is independent with ĝj,m0
and larger λ means that channel estimation gets worse.
Based on above preparations, we analyze the asymptotic
expression of γ as NT →∞.
Theorem 1: With precise channel estimated, the asymptotic
expression of γ as NT →∞ is:
γasy
∆
= γperfectasy
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
1 +
NTγ
γKc + 1
(12)
and the result with estimation errors is:
γasy
∆
= γerrorasy
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
1 +
NTγ (1−λ)
γKc + λγ + 1
, 0 <λ < 1 (13)
Therefore, the decoding error probability satisfies:
Pd
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
Q
(
C (γasy)−R√
V (γasy)/(Ndn)
)
(14)
The failure probability of systems can be finally expressed
as the Eq. (15). The specific value of γasy depends on the
estimation assumption.
E. Fundamental Tradeoffs
Obviously, we can find a reliability-latency tradeoff in Eq.
(15). Besides this, we would like to give another tradeoff,
that is, reliability-accessibility tradeoff. Let us first define the
accessibility which is the practice of keeping high reliability
while being usable by as many ALUs as possible, operating
within specified tolerances.
Definition 1: We define the ξ-accessibility of uplink grant-
free multiple access with protected CSI as the ratio of the
number of multiplexed ALUs that could maintain Pe less than
ξ to the number of OFDM symbols for channel estimation and
data decoding during this period, that is,
S =
K
T − Textra , Pe ≤ ξ (16)
where T −Textra = (K + 1 +md)Ts and ξ denotes the reli-
ability constraint, usually equal to 10−5 when ultra-reliability
is required.
Obviously, more accessibility will incur less reliability and
vice versa.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the reliability performance of
grant-free multiple access with protected CSI. We consider
the frequency range 1 defined in [9] in which the channel
bandwidth of 100MHz can be at most supported. Subcarrier
spacing is configured as 60kHz and Ts = 17.86× 10−6 under
5G NR transmission numerologies defined in [9]. During the
channel estimation, two pilot tones every three subcarriers are
configured with one single subcarrier for secure pilot coding
and one single pilot subcarrier for channel estimation, which
is similar to the set-up in LTE [3]. This can support NR =
512 = NE independent subcarrier channels for H2DF coding
with k = 3. For data transmission, we consider K ALUs
transmitting packets of R = 32 bytes over shared ND = 4
subcarriers. The number of channel taps is 6 and the latency
constraint of T ≤ 1ms is imposed.
Fig. 4 presents the curve of Pe versus the channel estimation
error. The γ is fixed to be at 10 dB. As we can see, Pe becomes
increased with increasing λ above a certain threshold of error.
With the increase of number of antennas, this threshold of error
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Fig. 6. Reliability-accessibility tradeoff under different number of mini-slots
for data transmission.
comes to be less sensitive to its changes. The reason is that the
estimation error becomes less with the increase of antennas.
The increase of ALUs also increases Pe. More AlUs introduce
more uncertainty on channel estimation and more disturbance
under estimation errors.
Fig. 5 shows the novel reliability-latency tradeoff curves
under various number of ALUs. The number of antennas is
fixed to be 100 and the γ is fixed to be at 20 dB. As we
can see, Pe decreases with the increase of latency within a
certain interval for guaranteeing reliable data transmission.
More latency would not induce any improvement of reliability.
In Fig. 6, we simulate the curves of reliability-accessibility
tradeoff under different number of mini-slots for data trans-
mission. The number of antennas is fixed to be 100 and the
γ is fixed to be at 20 dB. To achieve the reliability less than
10−5, the number of mini-slots for data transmission should
be more than 18. With those preparations, we can see that the
reliability is decreased with the increase of accessibility.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed to apply H2DF coding to con-
ventional uplink grant-free multiple access to safeguard CSI.
We showed that though strengthening reliability, this operation
could affect the utilization of time-frequency resources and
therefore we characterised a novel expression of reliability and
accessibility of this system. We could show that there exist a
reliability-latency trade-off and a reliability-accessibility trade-
off. Those results presented the possibility of satisfying high
reliability requirements for URLLC services while protecting
CSI and also gave us hint of how to achieve this.
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